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Catastrophe and the Public Service: 
A Case Study of the Government Response 
to the Destruction of the World Trade Center 
The destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 200 " resulted in a rapid response 
by government to evacuate the area and, in subsequent days, to bring the city back to a sem-
blance of normalcy. This article provides a case study of government action in New York City 
during and after the World Trade Center catastrophe. What is most striking is the skill and intensity 
of government's response to the emergency and the hard work, dedication, and bravery of New 
York City's government officials. This article presents government and public service at its finest, 
under some of the most difficult conditions one can imagine. 
Learning from the Unthinkable 
This article presents a chronology of events subsequent 
to the attack on the World Trade Center and analyzes the 
role of leadership and standard operating procedures in 
crisis management. It tells the story of the mayor and his 
team of emergency response advisors and staff. We de-
scribe and assess the role of local elected officials in reas-
suring the city's residents, boosting morale, and prevent-
ing disorder after the catastrophe. We also provide profiles 
of the actions of local public servants. 
One purpose of this article is to present a positive story of 
public service and the centrality and importance of govern-
ment leadership in emergency response. The role of private 
citizens, private firms, and volunteers will be discussed. The 
article also recounts the fiscal impact of the event on New 
York City's government and the impact of this catastrophe 
on resource allocation for government emergency response. 
Finally, we analyze the lessons learned in the response ac-
tion and conclude with steps to be repeated and avoided in 
future emergency response actions. 
The Catastrophe and the Response 
Described 
September 11, 2001 
At 8:00 a.m. on September 11, 200 I, local New York 
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City officials knew the importance of the day ahead. It was 
primary election day, and for many, September 11 had the 
potential to redefine and transform their political careers. 
By 9:00 a.m., the election had been overshadowed by the 
crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower 
of the World Trade Center (Wall Street Journal 2001). 
Minutes later, a second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, 
crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. 
New York City was under attack. In less than one hour, the 
priorities of government officials in New York and across 
the nation had shifted dramatically~ommand centers and 
triage centers replaced voting booths, while news organi-
zations posted emergency phone numbers rather than voter 
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turnout rates. Most important, partisan politics were put 
aside in favor of four mutual goals: safety, communica-
tion, funding, and recovery for New York City. 
Like many Americans, New York City mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani's breakfast was interrupted by a telephone call 
alerting him of a horrible accident at the World Trade 
Center's North Tower (Seifman 2001). Giuliani quickly 
finished the meal he was sharing with top aide Denny 
Young, and the two drove downtown from the 50th Street 
restaurant toward City Hall. Within minutes, the mayor's 
phone rang again, this time alerting him of a plane hitting 
the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Giuliani 
changed his route and headed directly to the scene. 
As Giuliani raced to the World Trade Center from the 
north, Richard Sheirer, director of New York City's Office 
of Emergency Management rushed to the World Trade 
Center from the south. Established in 1996 by Mayor 
Giuliani in response to the 1993 World Trade Center at-
tack, the office acts as a liaison between all city agencies 
involved in emergency situations (Sandberg 2001). Prior 
to September 11, Sheirer's responsibilities included con-
trolling the city's rat population and communicating infor-
mation to residents about impending snowstorms. 
On this day, Sheirer's priority was securing lower Man-
hattan. To this end, he ordered the police department to close 
all roads below Canal Street, as well as all tunnels and 
bridges. He also activated the city's Emergency Operations 
Center, a $13 million, 50,OOO-square-foot "watch command" 
located on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center (Bowles 
2001). Housing numerous telecommunications and secu-
rity systems, the Emergency Operations Center was expected 
to serve as the core logistics center for as many as 68 city 
agencies immediately following the attacks (ArcNews 
Online 2002). From here, Sheirer, Mayor Giuliani, and per-
sonnel from organizations including the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) and the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency could collect and redistribute orders and up-
dates to both law enforcement and residents. 
When the second plane hit, debris flew into 7 World 
Trade Center, forcing Sheirer to evacuate the Emergency 
Operations Center and set up a command center in the lobby 
of the North Tower (Campo-Flores 2001). Sheirer then 
ordered the Coast Guard to seal New York harbor and asked 
the Pentagon to close the city's airspace (Griscom 2001). 
Concerned about additional attacks, Sheirer spoke with 
NYPD brass, which agreed that its helicopter pilots should 
be prepared to crash their choppers into any other planes 
attempting to attack the city (CBS News 2002). 
Shutting down lower Manhattan facilitated quicker 
movement of emergency workers and supplies to the "hot 
zone" (Archibold 2001). Police commissioner Bernard 
Kerik spearheaded the latter effort. Kerik met Giuliani and 
several top fire department officials near the base of the 
Twin Towers just as the second plane hit at 9:03 a.m. 
(Marzulli 2001). Unable to contact the Emergency Opera-
tions Center, the staff moved to a makeshift command post 
at 75 Barclay Street to avoid the falling debris. Here, 
Giuliani, Kerik, and top aides received briefings about the 
unfolding situation and, from that location, managed ini-
tial safety actions and communications. During this time, 
Giuliani conferred with Sheirer, who directed the closure 
of all nonemergency activity and entrants below 14th Street. 
Just as Sheirer attempted to communicate with federal 
officials in the Capitol, Kerik tried to coordinate efforts 
with NYPD officers throughout the five boroughs. Yet, like 
most offices located in lower Manhattan, access to tele-
phone, cellular, pager, and email communications was spo-
radic. Nevertheless, Kerik was able to put the department 
on "Condition Omega," its highest state of alert (Marzulli 
2001). Established in preparation for terrorism threats co-
inciding with Y2K, Condition Omega "calls for lightning 
action minutes after any incident, with thousands of New 
Yorkers being stopped and questioned and entire sections 
of the city being closed off' (Marzulli 1999,6). As Kerik 
coordinated the overall response of the department, offic-
ers from the NYPD, fire department, and Port Authority 
worked methodically to evacuate approximately 25,000 
people from the World Trade Center complex. 
Four minutes after the United flight crashed into the 
World Trade Center, the first NYPD Emergency Service 
Unit arrived on the scene (McPhee and O'Shaughnessy 
2001). Carrying rescue harnesses, hand and hydraulic tools, 
ropes, and medical supplies, four teams of five to six Emer-
gency Service Unit workers climbed the North Tower stair-
ways, "administering first aid where necessary." When 
alerted to the South Tower plane crash, two of the Emer-
gency Service Unit teams headed for that building, and 
more police arrived on the scene to support the effort. 
Machine guns and extra handguns now supplemented medi-
cal and rescue equipment. 
Also climbing the stairs to aid rescue efforts were mem-
bers of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), who ar-
rived on the scene about the same time as the Emergency 
Service Unit. They entered the North Tower and immedi-
ately began directing people down the stairwells and out of 
the building via the former floor-to-ceiling glass walls of 
the mezzanine that had been shot out by a Port Authority 
officer. By this time, Deputy Fire Chief Peter Hayden com-
manded evacuation of the entire World Trade Center area. 
Supporting the 500 firefighters in the Twin Towers were 
approximately 200 Port Authority police officers (McPhee 
and O'Shaughnessy 2001), many of whom were already in 
the building, as the Port Authority had offices within the 
World Trade Center complex (Schwaneberg 2001). 
Supporting the FDNY effort was the department's com-
missioner, Thomas Von Essen. A firefighter for 26 years 
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before becoming commissioner in 1996, Von Essen's pres-
ence in the World Trade Center was to "support, help get 
resources and criticize ... [to] break their chops a little," 
and to give recommendations for evacuation to Mayor 
Gi ul iani" (Mashood et al. 2001, 8). As numerous fire chiefs 
and tour commanders were also present, Von Essen resisted 
making operating decisions and instead headed for the 
Emergency Operations Center at 7 World Trade Center. At 
that point, the event was "still exciting" for himself and 
many of the firefighters. 
Just minutes after Giuliani and Kerik had settled in to 
their newest makeshift command post at a nearby firehouse, 
the South Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m. and blockaded the 
group in the building. Von Essen, after finding the Emer-
gency Operations Center evacuated, watched the tower fall 
while walking toward the mayor's temporary headquar-
ters. "Immediately ... the magnitude of the loss was evi-
dent to him without having to hear any numbers" (Mashood 
et al. 200 I , 8). After two more attempts to set up command 
posts, the mayor, police, Office of Emergency Manage-
ment director, and newly arrived FDNY commissioner 
settled in at the library of the police academy. For the next 
48 hours, their teams worked feverishly to secure the city 
and its people from this unpublicized location. 
While many public officials and agencies worked to-
gether to coordinate evacuation and security efforts, oth-
ers, by design or by chance, worked alone. This included 
Transportation Commissioner Iris Weinshall, who was at 
the Department of Transportation's executive office in 
lower Manhattan when the first plane hit. Her first action 
was to determine what to do with all the people in her 
building. That decision was made for her when the NYPD 
arrived, requesting they evacuate the space. Officers con-
veyed additional information about the situation, includ-
ing details about the evacuation of the Emergency Op-
erations Center at 7 World Trade Center. "[I realized that] 
the chain of command was completely broken," said 
Weinshall. 'The Office of Emergency Management site 
was struck, and phone and power lines were down at City 
Hall. At that moment, I was in charge of my own destiny 
until I could hook up again with someone at City Hall" 
(Mashood et al. 2001, 13). 
As transportation commissioner, Weinshall's responsi-
bility included oversight of most streets, roads, traffic lights, 
tunnels, and bridges for New York City (Mashood et aI., 
2001). The Transportation Department runs the Franchise 
Bus System, the fourth-largest commuter bus system in 
the nation, as well as the Staten Island Ferry. On the morn-
ing of September 11, Weinshall contemplated how to use 
these transportation systems to quickly and efficiently get 
people out of lower Manhattan. Weinshall's efforts were 
complemented by her staff, most of whom decided to stay 
in the office to help the evacuation effort, even after the 
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evacuation announcement. By morning's end, Weinshall 
had moved their base of operations to a small operational 
facility at 158th Street, where she and her team remained 
for the next two and a half days. 
Even though she was isolated in Washington Heights, 
Weinshall set up a system of ferries and express and fran-
chise buses to escort people out of Manhattan (Mashood 
et al. 2001). Here, watercraft corralled from the Transpor-
tation Department's purview, party-boat companies, the 
NYPD harbor unit, and commercial tugboat companies 
worked together to transport approximately half a million 
people out of Manhattan by 6:00 p.m. Overseeing evacua-
tion by bus was Transit Police Chief Michael Ansbro, who 
ordered 50 to 60 buses to transport civilians to Brooklyn, 
where the buses picked up emergency personnel to bring 
back into Manhattan. 
Though buses and boats were used throughout the day 
to escort people out of lower Manhattan, PATH trains trav-
eling underneath the World Trade Center evacuated ap-
proximately 3,000 people in the first minutes after the at-
tacks (McPhee and O'Shaughnessy 2001). While standing 
on the concourse of the World Trade Center station, PATH 
deputy director Victoria Cross Kelly observed several po-
lice officers ordering people to leave the area. Though she 
was unaware of the enormity of the situation, she under-
stood that incoming PATH trains needed to stop letting 
commuters disembark at the station. Kelly contacted train-
master Richie Moran, who then directed one incoming train 
to skip the World Trade Center stop and return to New 
Jersey. Another train's passengers were unloaded at a stop 
in New Jersey and then routed to the World Trade Center 
station to evacuate civilians on site. Kelly and Moran's 
timely actions assisted in the evacuation of approximately 
3,000 civilians. 
As Giuliani, Kerik, Weinshall, and many others tackled 
larger-scale issues facing New York City that morning, a 
few city officials experienced the day as many New York 
residents did, immersed in the intimate, individual responses 
of the evacuation effort. A member of City Council for more 
than 25 years, Peter Vallone was in the midst of the may-
oral primary on September 11. When Vallone learned of 
the attack, he stopped campaigning, but was unsure of what 
immediate assistance he, as city council speaker, could pro-
vide to affected citizens. So for the remainder of the day, 
Vallone stood by the 59th Street Bridge and handed out 
food and water to the thousands of individuals streaming 
out of Manhattan on foot. For hours, he spoke with people 
about the attacks and listened to their reactions. "He did 
this not because he felt it was his duty as a public service 
leader, but rather because he wanted to be with the people 
he represented" (McKenzie et al. 2001, 16). 
By noon on September 11, securing New York City was 
not only a local effort, but also involved state and federal 
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coordination. Some of the most significant support was 
provided by New York's governor's office. In Manhattan, 
when the attacks occurred, Governor George Pataki's first 
steps were similar to Richard Shierer's, and they included 
contacting the White House to secure the city's airspace 
while activating the state's Emergency Operations Center 
(Perez-Pena 2001). Next, Pataki put the National Guard 
on alert and declared a state disaster emergency. The latter 
declaration led to implementation of the state's disaster 
preparedness plan, which gave state agencies license to 
fully assist all relief and evacuation efforts in New York 
City. Pataki also called off the statewide elections in 
progress, including New York City's primary. 
In the midst of making these decisions, Governor Pataki 
and senior emergency response officials joined Mayor 
Giuliani in the first of many press conferences. Though 
visibly shaken, the mayor conveyed his sentiments and all 
available information with a calm, composed approach. 
''I'd ask the people of New York City to do everything that 
they can to cooperate, not to be frightened, to go about 
their lives as normal. Everything is safe right now in the 
city. And the people who are doing the relief effort need 
all of the help they can get" (McKenzie et al. 2001,4). 
In this and subsequent press conferences, Giuliani acted 
as the primary spokesperson for the city. "While reassur-
ing the public of the city's safety, he managed to commu-
nicate important logistical information such as the num-
ber of injured and missing people, details of the [World 
Trade Center] rescue effort, blood donation information, 
hospital traffic, transportation issues, and school closings" 
(Mashood et al. 2001, 5). 
Government Response after September 11, 2001 
In addition to hourly press conferences by Mayor 
Giuliani in the days and weeks following September 11, 
daily briefings were given by organizations such as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Ap-
pointed by FEMA director Joseph Allbaugh, Federal Co-
ordinating Officer Ted Monette served as the agency's "per-
sonal representative on the ground during the duration" of 
the World Trade Center disaster (FEMA 2001a). As the 
hours passed, rescue and relief activities took priority over 
the relatively complete civilian evacuation. By this time, it 
was apparent that many emergency personnel who had 
entered the World Trade Center, as well as employees al-
ready in the towers, had not emerged when the South and 
North Towers fell. Monette's briefings emphasized FEMA's 
desire to locate survivors, as well as "to provide support 
and assistance to the city and the state for the response 
phase and long-term recovery" (FEMA 2001 b). 
By Wednesday morning, 2,250 National Guardsmen had 
relieved many of the NYPD and FDNY members who had 
been in lower Manhattan since the first attack. In addition, 
all of the NYPD's 41,000 officers had been called to duty 
by Tuesday afternoon, working in 12-hour shifts patrol-
ling city streets and working in teams to search for survi-
vors. In the burning rubble where the World Trade Center 
once stood-an area now referred to as "Ground Zero"-
FEMA and the FDNY, the latter of which had several hun-
dred firefighters missing, supported the search for survi-
vors, removal of the dead, and cleanup of an estimated 1.2 
million tons of debris. 
Starting on Friday, September 14, coordination for res-
cue and relief activities was administered from Pier 92, a 
huge shipping warehouse on the Hudson River, which the 
Office of Emergency Management had secured months 
prior in anticipation of a large-scale bioterrorism drill the 
agency had planned to hold on September 12. From this 
site, Richard Sheirer oversaw the distribution of resources 
to Ground Zero and supervised 300 to 500 emergency per-
sonnel from numerous city, state, and federal agencies 
(Crenson 200 I). Here, many elected and appointed city 
officials congregated to review the previous day's events 
and plans for the next day's activities. Reflecting on the 
mayor's handling of these daily meetings, New York City 
comptroller Alan Hevesi stated that "regardless of any criti-
cism you may have of the mayor, he was tremendous" 
(McKenzie et al. 2001, 13) 
Perhaps the most visible department that Sheirer coor-
dinated was FEMA. Meeting several times daily with the 
Office of Emergency Management, Ted Monette's FEMA 
operation took its cues from Richard Sheirer, and together 
they established a toll-free telephone line to identify and 
register all homes and businesses damaged by the attack 
(FEMA 2001 c). Announcing the service through Web sites, 
newspapers, and press conferences, the hotline received 
more than 1,000 calls in the first week alone. For those 
homeowners and renters with legitimate grievances, grants 
were given for repairs and several months rent, to tide 
people over as their homes and offices were made habit-
able again. To ensure against multiple requests from the 
same complaint, Monette employed agents from FEMA's 
inspector general to cross-check claims against insurance 
claims and other agencies' support services. 
Recognizing that some residents in affected areas might 
not be aware of the available FEMA support, Monette 
dispatched staffers who, in conjunction with nonprofit 
and religious aid workers, went door-to-door alerting 
people to the services and funding available. Speaking of 
the process, Monette stated, "the teams are a vital link 
between the community and relief agencies. This one-
on-one contact helps us clear up situations that some-
times get in the way of providing the help people need" 
(Mashood et aI., 18). 
Complementing FEMA's door-to-door relief program 
was the "Ground Zero Task Force," a multilevel govern-
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ment initiative created by Congressman Jerrold Nadler. 
Representing the 8th District of New York, Nadler's con-
stituents are some of the most diverse in the nation. In 
Washington, D.C., at the time of the attacks, Nadler's first 
meeting with multiple public officials occurred on the af-
ternoon of Wednesday, September 12, where Giuliani con-
vened all agency heads at the secretly located operations 
center, the Police Academy. "The congressman was amazed 
at the efficiency of this meeting. The mayor addressed one 
agency head at a time, told them what the city needed from 
them, and it was immediately done." (McKenzie et aI., 14) 
Recognizing the initial focus of government activity 
would be on rescue and recovery of those injured or killed 
during the attacks, Nadler created a task force to address a 
different population: the 25,000 residents of lower Man-
hattan. Nadler directed his relief efforts at individuals who 
had been displaced from their homes and people who were 
unable to care for themselves or access basic provisions, 
such as food, medicine, sanitation, and electricity, on their 
own. Comprising elected officials from the city, state, and 
federal levels, "the task force [maximized] operational ef-
ficiency because it created a direct communication link to 
disaster management officials" (McKenzie et al. 2001, 14). 
The task force supplied messengers to bring prescriptions 
to civilians who were unable to travel to pharmacies and 
negotiated with Verizon Wireless to provide cell phones to 
residents who had lost telephone lines. 
While Mayor Giuliani, Richard Sheirer, and others 
worked to secure the city, New York Senators Hilary 
Clinton and Chuck Schumer worked to access federal 
funding for the city's relief and recovery efforts. Together, 
the two negotiated a federal commitment of $20 billion 
for rescue, recovery, and rebuilding operations in New 
York City (Schumer 2002). This included $2.75 billion 
in new funds for FEMA to help reimburse city and state 
agencies for overtime expenses and for replacement of 
destroyed or damaged equipment (Schumer 2002). The 
federal package also funded "clean-up costs, transporta-
tion infrastructure, utilities reconstruction, and economic 
stabilization for businesses and displaced workers" 
(Mashoodetal. 2001,17). 
Complementing Senators Clinton and Schumer's fis-
cal objectives in Washington was an early analysis of the 
attack's fiscal impact by Comptroller Alan Hevesi. 
Hevesi's staff estimated that "The attack on the World 
Trade center will likely cost the City economy between 
$90 billion and $105 billion by the end of fiscal year 2002" 
(Press Office 2001). In addition to managing the finan-
cial affairs ofthe city, Hevesi and his campaign stafftrans-
formed his downtown office into a mini-disaster relief 
center. For several weeks, they collected supplies from 
corporate sponsors such as Timberland to donate to the 
relief effort. Reflecting on that first month after Septem-
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ber 11, Hevesi credits his leadership to his staff: "I am a 
delegator, and have nine deputy comptrollers who are 
experts and know more than me. I [was] simply the man-
ager who provides resources and deals with other offi-
cials '" I am very proud of what we did as a team. We 
jumped in and we would not [have done] anything differ-
ently" (McKenzie et al. 2001, 13). 
One of Comptroller Hevesi's rivals in the city's may-
oral race, New York City council speaker Vallone, assisted 
the city's economic recovery effort by supporting legisla-
tion in the City Council to create a Lower Manhattan and 
Financial District Redevelopment Commission. In a press 
conference held soon after the attacks, Vallone stated, "Sep-
tember 11 ... created an economic crater that extends for 
miles around the World Trade Center" (McKenzie et al. 
2001, 16). To help address the financial situation, this nine-
member body would "facilitate and coordinate [the local 
government's part in] redevelopment and reconstruction 
of this area, and provide assistance to businesses located 
in the affected area., .. Such efforts should be accomplished 
with the full cooperation of all City agencies, through pub-
lic-private partnerships, and through coordination with fed-
eral and state authorities" (McKenzie et aI. 2001, 16). 
Introduction of legislation addressing the attacks oc-
curred at both the state and federal levels. Congressman 
Nadler introduced a Public Safety Officer Benefit Program 
to compensate the families of officers who had been killed 
in the line of duty. Nadler drafted this legislation on the 
evening of September 12, introduced it in the House of 
Representatives at 10:40 the next morning, and had it passed 
in both houses of Congress 12 hours later. President George 
W. Bush signed it into law on the morning of September 
14 (McKenzie et al. 2001, 14). 
For all of the financial and legislative support provided 
at the state and federal levels, the primary focus after 
9/11 remained in New York City. In the days and weeks 
following the attacks, Mayor Giuliani was New York's prin-
cipal spokesperson. Beginning with a 7:00 a.m. strategy 
session with public officials from all levels of government 
(including Governor Pataki), the mayor's days included 
walking tours of Ground Zero to monitor the progress of 
the relief effort, as well as walking tours of hospitals and 
triage sites. Giuliani also held multiple press conferences 
each day to keep the public informed of relief and recov-
ery efforts. "He also appeared almost daily on local and 
national news programs, each time touting the heroism of 
the rescuers and the bravery of New Yorkers" (Mashood et 
al. 200 1,5). Giuliani worked to inspire a sense of normalcy 
in his audience, be it public officials participating in the 
relief efforts or New York City residents watching him 
speak on television. He also encouraged New Yorkers to 
resist hatred against Arab nations and Arab Americans and 
to adopt a spirit of helping others. 
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As the days between September 11 and the present 
turned to weeks, New York City public officials fulfilled 
their primary duties and the evolving responsibilities cre-
ated by 9/11. For months, Giuliani joined FDNY commis-
sioner Von Essen as a full-time "comforter," attending 
countless funerals for fallen emergency personnel and other 
victims of the World Trade Center attacks. This particular 
role extended through the ranks, as described by Von 
Essen's September 15 comment that "every member of the 
fire department is either at a funeral, in a firehouse, or at 
ground zero" (Mashood et al. 2001, 9). 
Just as job priorities shifted, so too did the expectations 
for public officials' definition of relief. One project that 
remained constant from the moment the Twin Towers col-
lapsed through the spring of 2002 was the cleanup of 
Ground Zero. Though it shifted away from a rescue opera-
tion, more than 600 firefighters and hundreds of rotating 
volunteers worked 24 hours a day searching for survivors 
and remains in the rubble. Initially supervising this effort 
was Commissioner Von Essen, who "described the initial 
effort as similar to 'the way they built the pyramids: bucket 
brigades of hundreds of people, moving smaller pieces of 
debris to clear a path so the larger pieces could be removed. 
In time, engineers and construction experts joined the ef-
fort, along with greater access to, and use of, heavy equip-
ment" (Mashood et al. 2001, 9). 
By January 1,2002, most of the rubble ofthe Twin Tow-
ers was gone. Sixteen weeks after the attacks, hotdog stands 
had replaced triage tents, and wooden beams supporting a 
viewing platform of Ground Zero obscured the remaining 
steel beams mangled by the collapse of the World Trade 
Center. And just as the landscape of lower Manhattan was 
changing daily, so too was there a changing of the guard. 
The mayoral primaries postponed on September 11 even-
tually took place, and in November 2001, financier Michael 
Bloomberg was elected mayor. With Giuliani's departure 
at the strike of midnight on New Year's Eve came the res-
ignations of NYPD commissioner Bernard Kerik, FDNY 
commissioner Thomas Von Essen, and Office of Emergency 
Management director Richard Shierer, as well as the term 
endings for City Council President Peter Vallone and 
Comptroller Alan Hevesi. 
Though many New York City government officials who 
became familiar to the public after September 11 are gone, 
their work has been neither forgotten nor abandoned by 
the change in administration. Despite Giuliani's effort to 
have his term extended, the transition took place, and a 
new administration continued the city's reconstruction. As 
superb as his leadership was in the days after 9/11, the 
institutions of local government in New York City had 
proven durable and more than capable of peaceful and ef-
fective transition. 
The Catastrophe and Response Analyzed 
For the first several months after the attack on the World 
Trade Center, it was difficult to speak about the attack. 
Analysis seemed somehow trite and inappropriate. Still, 
as students of public management, we decided to ask our 
graduate students to research and analyze government's 
response to the attack. Some of the primary and secondary 
research reported in the previous section of this article came 
from that research effort. One of the coauthors of this piece 
was a teaching assistant during Columbia's fall 2001 pub-
lic management course. We felt it essential to draw les-
sons from these events. While we resist the notion that a 
proper role of research is catharsis, we admit that we be-
gan this research as a self-conscious strategy to help our 
community deal with this terrible tragedy. 
What is most striking is the skill and intensity of 
government's response to the emergency: The quick think-
ing of the PATH officials sending a train of passengers back 
to New Jersey and an empty train to Manhattan to facili-
tate evacuation. The decisions in the local schools near the 
World Trade Center to evacuate and for the rest of the city's 
schools to remain in session, taking particular care in en-
suring that all children were met by adults at the end of the 
day. Decisions to close the bridges, ports, and airports, and 
of course the mayor's inspiring personal leadership in the 
first hours and then first weeks after the attack. 
The first finding is that planning for emergencies was 
clearly present in New York City and helped to mitigate 
the impact of the attack. The modern city is a complex, 
interdependent system. These systems have redundancies, 
but also great vulnerabilities. Mayor Giuliani recognized 
the fragility of the city's systems and developed the orga-
nizational capacity for emergency response. When some 
of us outside of government criticized his penchant for 
security, he proved his critics wrong. While his selection 
of a location for an emergency coordination facility turned 
out to be a mistake, the planning, training, and communi-
cation infrastructure built for catastrophe proved worth-
while. More important, the capacity was matched with an 
unparalleled effort at intergovernmental coordination. 
The daily, high-level, early-morning coordination meet-
ing was an innovative way to ensure that communication 
and feedback was routinized. In this era of email and cell 
phones, face-to-face communication proved essential. This 
points to an area of research that should be undertaken: 
What is the effect of new electronic communications tech-
niques on organizational behavior? Why does face-to-face 
communication remain an essential element of a well-man-
aged organization? In what respect does sound written 
communication and even televised communication need 
to be amplified by in-person, three-dimensional, tactile 
communications? 
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There has been expert discussion of the field-commu-
nication failures that resulted in delayed evacuation and 
the death of hundreds of firefighters. Here, the lesson is 
straightforward-the need for emergency workers to pos-
sess the most modem communications equipment. How-
ever, the broader lesson is that despite the failures of many 
primary methods of communication, back-up systems 
worked, emergency response personnel appeared at the 
scene based on mass media reports, and prearranged emer-
gency response procedures dominated. The overall image 
from the scene was a calm (perhaps stunned) and orderly 
evacuation. There was little panic and no disorder. 
The New York Fire Department has gone through an 
intense period of self-evaluation to reexamine the standard 
operating procedures that resulted in the large number of 
fatalities suffered by the department. According to one early 
assessment, "Jolted by the mass deaths of rescuers in New 
York, firefighters won't be so quick to rush into burning 
high-rises and will broadly rethink how to protect them-
selves while trying to save others .... They will review how 
they confront big fires in high-rises, defend rescuers from 
secondary terrorist attacks, train for collapse-prone build-
ings, keep command centers safe, and prepare and equip 
themselves for chemical and biological weapons" (Donn 
200 I). The New York Fire Department's own internal as-
sessment cited communication breakdowns as a major 
cause of the failure to evacuate the towers after the order 
to do so was given. According to one report, "Much of the 
difficulty was a result of hundreds of firefighters who had 
responded though not on duty at the time. They came by 
taxi, subway and bus, by foot, or by crowding on to fire 
trucks on their way to the site. When the order to evacuate 
came, that meant that many firefighters did not have ra-
dios and the department did not know how many were in 
the twin towers or where they were .... The Fire Depart-
ment ... does not know why more of its personnel did not 
evacuate the towers .... It was possible that firefighters had 
not heard the order, were unable to get out quickly enough, 
were unable to receive radio transmissions because of an 
equipment malfunction, or felt they could save a life by 
staying" (Lipton and Glanz 2001, B4). 
The lesson here is that in addition to improved commu-
nications equipment, firefighters must reexamine their own 
standard operating procedures. The direct-response culture 
of the department saves lives in most situations, but it may 
be inappropriate in the case of catastrophes such as 9/11. 
At the time of the World Trade Center collapse, it was 
obvious to many that the City of New York was under at-
tack, and the many media-induced images of collective 
response and pulling together clicked into effect as people 
moved to help each other and escape the scene. The image 
ofthe World Trade Center's collapse was, for many people, 
like a scene from a science fiction movie. While we could 
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imagine such an event, the fact of its occurrence in real 
life registered, but in some way remained unreal. The ef-
fect of these images and these events on mass behavior 
was visible in New York City, and in coming years it should 
be the subject of detailed analysis. 
The decentralization of municipal administration and 
the size of New York City worked in its favor during and 
after the attack. Emergency crews arrived on the scene 
without direct orders to do so. In some cases, they acted 
according to prearranged emergency plans, and in other 
cases they came out of a sense of duty and responsibility. 
Decisions by the Board of Education, school principals, 
teachers, and New York City commissioners were made 
without waiting for clearance from above. Because the 
image of a worst-case emergency scenario existed in the 
minds of many key decision makers, they responded to 
these images with actions that were decisive and clear. 
A depth of leadership throughout the city was demon-
strated on that day and in the following weeks. In our view, 
our information-based, complex society has provided a 
leadership culture that permits and possibly encourages 
innovation. Clearly, this is a researchable question. The 
Giuliani administration was highly centralized on normal 
days, but during an emergency, leadership action was in-
spired, orderly, and creative. Why? 
This leads to another finding for planners and policy 
makers and the need to learn more about the impact of 
wartime mobilization on people and organizations. The 
World Trade Center site was cleared of debris about a year 
ahead of schedule. The number-one subway line tunnel 
under the World Trade Center was scheduled to reopen to 
South Ferry nine months ahead of schedule. Partisan poli-
tics disappeared from view for at least 60 days. Demo-
cratic senators and representatives worked as a team with 
a Republican governor and mayor. The feuding governor 
and mayor ended their conflict, with the mayor playing 
the role of lead responding official and the governor the 
role of ally and supporter bringing state resources to bear 
on the crisis. Why? 
We have seen this phenomenon during other emergen-
cies. Workers during the home-front mobilization in World 
War II worked hard and produced at an extraordinary rate. 
According to one account, at the start of World War II, 
... Our anny had more horses than tanks and Nazi 
U-boats were sinking American merchant ships with 
shocking ease. It took a tremendous exercise of 
American will and power to turn the tide, a national 
mobilization such as this country had never seen 
before, and may never see again. And fueling it was 
raw revenge. retribution for the humiliating defeat 
at Pearl Harbor. Pearl might be the greatest Ameri-
can victory of the war. It awoke a sleeping giant. 
But it took almost no time to re-tool the economy 
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for wartime production. The world's greatest auto-
mobile society stopped making cars during the war 
and geared its auto plants to the production of every 
imaginable instrument of mobile warfare. At Henry 
Ford's gigantic new plant at Willow Run, outside 
Detroit, an assembly line a mile long poured out B-
24 bombers at a rate of a plane every 63 minutes .... 
America was a third rate military power in 1940. By 
1945 it was producing more weapons and firepower 
than the rest of the world put together. (Annenebergj 
CPB 2002, 1234) 
On a smaller scale, we saw a similar mobilization after 
9/11. The threat being more subtle than World War II, the 
mobilization was as well. But clearly, Ground Zero in New 
York City provided a less than subtle message. The end-
less loop of video tape seen by us all of the World Trade 
Center's collapse, and the faces of the members of fami-
lies that had lost loved ones, provided a high level of mo-
tivation for workers clearing debris or constructing new 
tunnels. How does this process work in this type of war, 
and is it different than World War II? Does instant and ubiq-
uitous communication intensify or reduce our reaction to 
these events? 
We had assumed by the spring of 2002 that the finan-
cial and organizational effect of the World Trade Center 
attack would be more obvious than it is. The impact on the 
city's economy has been felt primarily through a decline 
in tourism. The recession that began before 9/11 was in-
tensified by the attack, and New York City's government 
budget faced a $4 billion-$5 billion deficit in the follow-
ing fiscal year. The Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey lost leadership, staff, and its headquarters, and in 
many respects it may never recover from the attack. On a 
daily basis, in mid-2002, the city struggled to provide the 
resources needed to fund public education, maintain the 
nation's largest local police force, clean the streets of gar-
bage, and care for its aged, sick, and poor population. The 
resources that were so plentiful in the late 1990s are sud-
denly scarce again in the early twenty-first century. De-
spite considerable displays of bravado, those of us who 
live here, young and old, feel a sense of vulnerability and 
sadness that fades, but never disappears. 
The remedial economic impact of reconstruction is also 
difficult to project. The planning process for reconstruc-
tion has been slow and difficult as planners address a wide 
range of agendas, Some victims' families would like to 
see the entire site turned into a memorial. Residents in 
nearby Battery Park City would like to see reconstruction 
provide a more human-scale set of streets and buildings. 
There are, of course, financial interests that would like to 
make money from redevelopment. Some in the tourist in-
dustry see a major 9/11 memorial as a lure to worldwide 
tourism. The economic impact of this reconstruction will 
be felt throughout the region, but is impossible to measure 
at this point. Estimates of the Regional Plan Association 
and others are so contingent that they are best thought of 
as educated guesses. The early analysis of Comptroller 
Hevesi of a total financial cost of about $100 billion over 
two years has yet to be refuted. 
Lessons Learned 
What did we learn, then? We learned some prosaic op-
erational lessons that we should take care to record: 
• Emergency response planning is essential. 
• Emergency response institutions, procedures, and re-
sources must be retained, even when threats seem dis-
tant. 
• Communications systems must be made more redundant. 
Cellular and wired emergency communications systems 
must have at least two levels of backup to reduce the 
odds of failure during emergencies. 
• Emergency response procedures must assume commu-
nication breakdowns and allow for decentralized deci-
sion making. 
• There is no substitute for inspiring leadership during a 
cnSlS. 
However, the more profound lesson we learned is that 
public service and the ethos of public service are as impor-
tant as ever. We saw government workers die by the hun-
dreds in performance of their duty. We saw elected offi-
cials cast aside partisanship and work together as a team 
to manage the emergency response, reassure the public, 
and organize for recovery. We saw strength, patriotism, 
creativity, and incredible dedication to task, from the mayor 
to the volunteer passing buckets of rubble down a human 
chain of rescue workers. The key lesson of9/11 for public 
administration is the restatement and reassertion of our 
central guiding principle, the one that always appears on 
the inside back cover of this journal: Serve the Public In-
terest. Serve the public, beyond serving oneself. When the 
catastrophe came, our government, nonprofits, and citi-
zenry, for the most part, responded and lived up to this 
principle. Public service is hardwired into our culture-
into our government, our institutions, and our people. De-
spite the materialism, cynicism, and doubts reported so 
frequently by the media, when we need to, we remain ca-
pable of demonstrating creative, capable, and compassion-
ate public service. Those of us living in New York City in 
the autumn of2001 experienced that first-hand. It is some-
thing we will never forget. 
Catastrophe and the Public Service 31 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
References 
Annenberg/CPB. 2000. A Biography of America, World War II, 
1941-1945. The Home Front. Available at http://wt\w./earnel: 
orgiresourceslresource.htmf?uid=123&sj=. Accessed June 
18,2002. 
Archibold, Randal C. 200 I. Battery Park Set to Reopen to Resi-
dents of North End. New York Times. Dow Jones Interactive, 
September 20. Available at http://www.co/umbia.edu/culli-
brarieslindexesldow-jones-inter.html. Accessed March IS, 
2002. 
ArcNews Online. 2002. Managing Chaos Relies on Fast, Accu-
rate Information. April 1. Available at http://www.esri.com/ 
newsl archive slwinterO J 02 article sl nyc-creating .html. Ac-
cessed November-December, 2001. 
Bowles, Pete. 2002. Terrorist Attacks!Mayor's Emergency Cen-
ter Falls. Newsday, September 12, W41. Dow Jones Interac-
tive. Available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/in-
dexesldow-jones-inter.html. Accessed March 15, 2002. 
Campo-Flores, Arian. 2001. Saving New York. Newsweek.com, 
September 15. Available at http://www.msnbc.comlnews/NW-
frOllt _Front.asp. Accessed June 18, 2002. 
CBS News. 2002. 48 Hours at Ground Zero. CBS News Online. 
September 28. Available at http://www.cbsnews.comlstoriesl 
2001 109128148hollrsimain312902 .html. Accessed April I, 
2002. 
Crenson, Sharon L. 2001. City Commanders Make Do in Wake 
of Trade Center Attacks. Associated Press State and Local 
Wire. Dow Jones Interactive, September 20. Available at 
http://www.co/umbia .edul clilli brariesl i ndexe sl dow-jone s-
illfer. html. Accessed April 2002. 
Donn, Jeff. 2001. Firefighters Thinking More of Own Safety 
after Trade Center Disaster. Associated Press Newswire, Oc-
tober IS. Available at http://wire.ap.org/APnewsl?SITE= 
NYMEL&FRONTID=HOME. Accessed June 18,2002. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2001a. 
FEMA Damage Inspectors Visit Assistance Applicants. In-
formation on Federally Declared Disasters, September 25. 
Available at http://wwwjema.govldizOlldJ391nJ2.htm/.Ac-
cessed June 18,2002. 
---. 2001 b. One Week after Terrorist Attacks, Site Clear-
ance and Facilities Restoration Continues. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency News Room, September 18. Available 
at http://wwwjema.gov/nwzO J Inwzo1_114 .hunl. Accessed 
November-December 2001. 
---. 2001c. President Orders Disaster Aid for New York 
Terrorist Attack. Information on Federally Declared Disas-
ters, September 11. Available at http://wwwjema.govldizOll 
d1391n01.html. Accessed June 18, 2002. 
Griscom, Amanda. 2001. Man Behind the Mayor. New York 
Maga::.ine, October 15. Available at http://www.nymag.coml 
page.cj'm?page_id=5270. Accessed on June 18,2002. 
Lipton, Eric, and James Glanz. 2002. Ground Zero Firefighting: 
9/11 Inspires Call to Review Response Plan for Crises. New 
York Times, January 23, B4. 
32 Public Administration Review • September 2002, Vol. 62, Special Issue 
Marzulli, John. 1999. Secret Plan to Safeguard City. New York 
Daily News, December 30, 6. 
---. 200 I. Giuliani and Group of Top Cops Barely Dodged 
Death as Towers Fel!. Daily News, September 27, 22. 
Mashood, Issaka, Aimee Herbert, Noriko Kaiser, Katherine 
Lapham, Susan Neva, lara Peng, Zolaika Salihi, Rebecca 
Scheer, Nicole Sebastian, Jennifer Sklar, Daphne Stav-
ropolous, Katherine Stoehr, Yuki Taketani, Trin Tham-
kittikasem, Allison Tractman, Nicole Valenti, Yasuyuki 
Watanabe, and Chunyu Yu. 2001. Evaluation of Public Sec-
tor Response to the 2001 WTC Attack. Unpublished semi-
nar paper. Columbia University, School of International and 
Public Affairs, Graduate Program in Public Policy and Ad-
ministration. 
McKenzie, Peter, Marisela Perez, Laura Schmisskiss, Parita Shah, 
and Raissa Smoro!. 2001. A Paradigm of Leadership: Les-
sons Learned from Public Service Leaders in the Aftermath 
of September 11,2001. Unpublished seminar paper. Colum-
bia University, School of International and Public Affairs, 
Graduate Program in Public Policy and Administration. 
McPhee, Michele, and Patrice O'Shaughnessy. 2001. The Great 
Rescue of September II. New York Daily News, November 
11,4. 
NYC.gov, Department of Corrections. 2002. Former Commis-
sioner Kerik Becomes New Police Commissioner. DOC Web 
Archives, Department of Corrections, New York City, April 
I. Available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doC/html! 
pscshie/d.html. Accessed June 18,2002. 
Perez-Pena, Richard. 2001. Giuliani Closes Lower NYC. Pitts-
burgh Post-Gazette, September 12, A19. 
Press Office of New York City Comptroller William C. Thomp-
son, Jf. 2001. Trade Center Attack Could Cost City Economy 
More than $100 Billion Over 2 Years: City Will Need Addi-
tional Federal Aid to Recover. Available at http://www. 
Comptrollel:nyc.govlpressI2001 Jeleasesl. Accessed June 18, 
2002. 
Rashbaum, William K. 2001. Police Officers Swiftly Show In-
ventiveness during Crisis. New York Times, September 17, 
A7. 
Sandberg, Jared. 2001. Aide to Mayor Quietly Handles New York 
Rescue Effort. Wall Street Joumal, September 21. AIO. 
Schumer, Charles E. 2002. Schumer: White House Makes Good 
on $20 Billion Pledge to Aid NY Recovery. Press Room Web 
site of Senator Charles E. Schumer, March 7. Available at 
http:// schumer.senate .govi SchumerWebsitelpressrooml 
pressJe/easesl PR00877.htm/. Accessed June 18,2002. 
Schwaneberg, Robert. 2001. P.A. Staffers Ignored Danger. Star-
Ledger, September 14,13. 
Seifman, David. 2001. Rudy's Courage a Beacon for Us All. 
New York Post, September 17, 20. 
Wall Street Journal. 2001. A Day of Terror: Attacks Bring Clos-
ings across the Nation and Overseas. September 12, A4. 
